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Globalization extends the space of the things that are simultaneous for the human. This 
applies particularly to the decision-making in financial markets. The global market for 
capital is one of the main causes for globalization. How is this process of globalization 
to be judged from the point of view of business ethics?  
The paper investigates the ethical foundations of capital  markets and of financial 
consulting. It analyzes the foundational theories of corporate governance in the Anglo-
American and in the German context. Their difference can be described as external 
control by competition versus internal control by consensus. The paper gives merit to 
the different models of governance and to their origin in different conceptions of 
government. It argues for a twofold strategy: to strengthen the external control of firms 
by competing teams of management that are able to make an effective take-over threat 
and to implement elements of workers’ participation in corporate governance as long as 
increases the efficiency of management - provided that these elements maintain the 
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Space, says Leibniz, is the order of all things that are simultaneous, time is the order of 
all things that are non -simultaneous. Space and time order the things. The things that 
are simultaneous are arranged through the space, the things that are non-simultaneous 
through the time. All things are in space and in time and therefore spatially and 
temporally ordered. 
 
I. The extension of the simultaneity in space and the decrease of the non-simultaneity in 
time of humankind through the process of globalization 
 
With the Internet and the new technologies of communication, the basic order relations 
of the human being, space and time, have been changed, and thereby the simultaneity 
and the  non-simultaneity of the things for the human being have changed as well. 
Leibniz's definition describes the absolute space and the absolute time, not the space 
and the time of the human being. The definition is, however, also valid for the space 
and the time of the human being: It holds true that the space of the human being is the 
order of the things that are simultaneous for the human, and that the time is the order of 
the things that are non-simultaneous for the human being. The space of the human 
being is made up by the things which are simultaneously accessible for the human. The 
time of the human being is determined by what is non-simultaneous for the human. The 
time is the things in their succession, the space is the things in their simultaneity.  
With the Internet the relations of simultaneity and temporal succession as well as the 
relation of the centre and the periphery change. Through the Internet, also far away 
places which were formerly not simultaneous for us become simultaneous. Transactions 
and information over large distances, that were formerly non-simultaneous and outside 
of the individual’s space or range of decision-making, become simultaneous and move 
into the individual’s range of decision-making. Transactions that were formerly to be 
carried out only with great delay and therefore did not belong to the human’s space, to 
the human’s space of simultaneity, become simultaneous and move into the individual’s 
space or range of decision-making. The individual’s space of decision-making and 
action increases because the control of large spaces in simultaneity becomes possible. 
Financial investments contain always the element of entrepreneurial decision-making 
and control. To the degree in which effective control becomes possible over great 
distances, the spatial range and the simultaneous control possibilities for investments 
increase. With the aid of online-brokerage, a portfolio of shares can be controlled from 
every place of the world without high transaction costs. 
The process of globalization resulted in the years 1990s in the extension of finance 
investments to areas which before were not the aim of such investments, particularly the 
countries of the former East bloc as well as China and India. At the same time, the 
instrument was created by the Internet, by online-banking, and online-brokerage that 
facilitated the information circulation and transmission about the new investment space. 
Globalization brought these countries into the relationship of simultaneity and virtual 
proximity with the finance centres of the Western metropolitan cities, moved them into 
the decision-space of these centres.  
 
II. The globalization of the capital markets as a central feature of the process of 
globalization 
 
Three large extensions of world-wide financial investments were caused by the process   3 
of globalization which, in the field of financial investments and markets, is not only a 
process of spatial extension but also of intensification. The first factor, the spatial 
extension in geographical respect to new countries, was closely connected with the 
second factor, the extension and intensification  of financial information, and the third 
factor, the social extension of financial investments to new groups of investors in the 
population. With the extension of financial investments to wider circles of the 
population that up to now did not participate in the capital market, a third element of 
extension appears in the historical dynamics of globalized capital markets besides the 
spatial and informational extension and expansion. 
The following processes must be regarded as the central definitional features  of 
globalization according to Klaus Müller: 
 
Liberalization of the financial markets, 
Internationalization of cross-border ecological dangers, 
Trans-national mergers of corporations, 
Circulation by mass media of Western images and patterns of consumption, 
Increasing streams of trans-national and transcontinental migration, 
Decreasing effectiveness of policy making by the nation state.1 
 
Müller names the liberalization of the financial markets at first place, and, in fact, one 
will have to refer to the liberalization, internationalization, and extension of the 
financial markets as the strongest influential factor in the process of globalization. The 
increasingly location- and space-independent, ubiquitous access to knowledge and 
information is common to all the mentioned features of globalization. The decision-
maker’s space and range of decision-making have become global, the time for 
effectuating the decisions instantaneous, since knowledge about the entire world is 
faster available and can be documented better on storage media than in former times.2 
The decision-space becomes larger, the decision-time, the time to gather and process 
information about far removed places becomes almost negligible. The space made up 
by the things that are simultaneous for the human increases. In reverse, we can only 
perceive globalization since our information systems provide us with instantaneous 
knowledge about the global reality or at least about parts of it. With the Internet and the 
globalization of information processing, a nother effect is happening. The former 
difference, or even hiatus, between the centre and the periphery of the knowledge is 
increasingly levelled or even abolished. The catalogues of the largest libraries of the 
world are now accessible from the most remote village of the world via the internet as 
far as this village has a telephone line to the outside world. 
What is to be meant by the social extension of financial investments and financial 
institutions? The main drivers towards this extension are the pension funds. Peter 
Drucker published his book  The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism 
                                                  
1 Klaus Müller: Globalisierung (Globalization), Frankfurt, New York (Campus) 2002. 
2 Robert J. Shiller: Irrational Exuberance, Princeton and Oxford (Princeton University Press) 6th edition 
2001, points to the fact that installing the first transatlantic telephone cable has had a similar effect as the 
Internet on economic growth and on a stock market boom. It is, however, important to note the difference 
that the Internet, unlike the telephone, facilitates also the instantaneous documentation of the long-
distance communication.   4 
Came to America in the year 1976.3 The retirement or pension funds led already in the 
nineteen seventies to a socialization of investment. They further enforced the tendency 
recognized already by Marx in the joint-stock company, the dissolution of the class of 
capitalists into a larger group of capital owners or into a kind of socialized capital 
ownership. The question whether pension fund capitalism is already real socialism must 
be left unanswered here. The pension and investment funds as well as the widening of 
ownership of shares through online-brokerage contain an element of the socialization of 
the property in the means of production and are a drive towards the expansion of the 
capital market. 
A further factor driving towards the expansion of the capital market is the attempt of 
many employees observed in the USA since the nineteen eighties to improve their 
income through speculation in shares and thereby to provide a second income for 
themselves.  
All the four tendencies mentioned have caused an expansion of the capital market with 
the effect that a volume of the investment amounts and a volume of trade in shares have 
occurred that had been unknown before in economic history. The expansion and the 
worldwide internationalization of financial investments and of the capital market are 
probably the most important feature of the present globalization. As in the other fields 
of globalization, globalization is also in finance more than mere internationalization. It 
implies not only that a corporation becomes internationally active and is present in 
many other countries. Globalization requires, rather, an integration of the national 
capital markets into a global capital m arket, that the corporations act globally also with 
respect to corporate finance in an integrated space of financial investment and 
refinancing since global investment has become technically possible through the new 
global means of communication and the internet. 
 
III. On the ethics of the capital market 
 
How can one analyze ethically the institutions of and the individual actions in the 
capital market? From the approach of ethical economy developed by the author,4 the 
ethical presuppositions of the functioning conditions and of the rationality of the capital 
market and the actions therein are at the centre of an economical and ethical analysis of 
the capital market. A decisive test for the functioning conditions of a set of institutions 
or of a market is the question whether being active in these institutions or in this market 
causes unintended side-effects which contradict the institutional objective or purpose 
and disturb its workings. If the side-effects become considerable, institutional changes 
must be carried out. If, for instance, the trade runs smoothly but extreme “churning” of 
investors occurs, institutional precautions against this churning must be taken. Churning 
of investors describes a situation in which high commissions and fees are paid due to a 
high volume of share trading but in which these fees and commissions paid by the 
investors are higher than the investors’ returns on investment. The situation is 
particularly problematic if the investors are not made aware of this by an appropriate 
disclosure of the fees and commissions by the brokerage firm or bank.  
Before one asks the question as to the ethical quality of an action within an 
                                                  
3 New York (Harper and Row) 1976. 
4  P. Koslowski:  Principles of Ethical Economy, Dordrecht, London, Boston (Kluwer) 2001. German 
Original: Prinzipien der Ethischen Ökonomie, Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 1988.   5 
institutional setting, of an acting person’s intention and values, the question must be 
asked as to the norms, the rules and duties of this institutional setting. In order to be 
able to determine the rules and duties, it is to be asked what the right law would be in 
the institutional setting under consideration. The question about the ideal right or the 
right law and right order of rules is to be answered according to Radbruch by applying 
three principles: first, the question about the purpose of the institutional field or 
institutional setting that is supposed to be ruled by norms, secondly, the idea of justice 
as formal justice and equal right of all acting or being concerned by the institutional 
field under consideration, and thirdly, the principle of legal security that requires that 
those who act in the institutional field are able to form constant expectations  with 
respect to the perpetuity of the law and the continuity of the jurisdiction. Without 
constancy of expectations with respect to the legal norms, no effective legal order and 
no adequate ethics are possible.5 
If one applies these principles to the institutional setting of the capital market, at first 
the purpose of the capital market is to be clarified. A set of institutions as complex as 
the market for capital and corporate control serves, in general, several purposes that can 
even stand in a relationship of tension towards each other. The purposes or functions of 
the capital market can be distinguished into four partial purposes: 1. the saving 
function: The capital market absorbs savings; 2. the wealth function: The capital market 
is used for the storage of purchasing power over longer time periods; 3. the liquidity 
function: The capital market offers investors the possibility to convert their financial 
assets into cash again in order to have liquid financial means at any time; 4. the 
economic policy function of the capital and money market: Through capital market 
policy and monetary policy, the economic policy maker can influence the economic 
situation and trade cycle and can control macroeconomic demand.6 
Through a rise or decrease of the money supply the government induces an increase 
or reduction of the demand for shares and in this way influences the share prices. A 
rising or lowering of the share prices increases, in turn, reduces the consumption 
expenditures of the economic agents since the individuals’ consumption expenditures 
are influenced by the value of their wealth assets. If the share prices, and therefore their 
perceived wealth, are higher, the investors have a higher net wealth and will increase 
their consumption expenditures. If the government reduces the money supply and 
induces a rise of the interest rate, it causes a decrease of the share prices. Decreasing 
share prices cause that the share owners, the consumers, consume less because they 
have the perception that they are less prosperous. 
By means of the money supply and the interest rate, the government can influence 
the value of the wealth invested in shares and, thereby, the rate of consumption that is 
partly determined by the capital value of the shares the consumers hold. In this way, 
economic policy is able to influence the trade cycle, accelerate it or slow it down. The 
American government stabilized, for instance, the share prices in the years 2002/3 
through a politics of easy money in order to maintain a pattern of high consumption 
rates by keeping the value of the private wealth in shares stable since both, share prices 
and consumption expenditures, threatened to decrease even further in the recession.  As 
                                                  
5 Cf. Gustav Radbruch: Rechtsphilosophie (Philosophy of Law), Stuttgart (Koehler) 8th edition 1973. 
6 For the functions of the capital and money market, cf. Peter S. Rose: Money and Capital Markets. 
Financial Institutions and Instruments in a Global Marketplace, Boston et al. (McGraw-Hill) 7th edition 
2000, p. 6ff.   6 
consumption is also a function of the consumer’s net wealth, private consump tion had 
been pushed by a policy of easy money and by the increased share prices induced by the 
low credit rates credit enabled by the easy money policy. 
In the capital market, the objective of the efficient allocation of capital stands at the 
centre. The  question where capital is supposed to be invested is of the greatest 
importance for every economy. The objective of optimal capital allocation implies the 
solution to the question, in which projects, technologies, industries, regions etc. the 
economy invests and which future projects get a chance and receive investment. Since 
the investors decide ex ante which developments they hold to be the right and desirable 
ones, their decisions are always burdened with high uncertainty. The consumer in the 
market decides, on the other hand, ex post, after the investment being done, what he 
likes in the supply of firms that have made their decision in the past. The market 
decides after the investment being made which investment decisions of the firms have 
been right. 
Fundamentally, three social decision mechanisms are available to an economy for 
capital allocation: The economy can leave the allocation decision with banks or with the 
government as in a centrally administered economy or with a specialised market of its 
own in which savers/investors as suppliers of capital and enterprises as demand for 
capital coordinate their plans and their expectations by the price mechanism. A capital 
market corresponds better as a coordination mechanism for the allocation of capital to a 
democratic society than the coordination through large banks or through centrally 
administered economic direction by the government.7 The capital market is, like other 
markets, a means to diversify and to control economic power since it creates 
competition between the supply and demand of capital. This market as venture capital 
market is furthermore open to new ideas and offers a chance to the new and the 
unknown yet and even to the outsider. 
If the capital market is supposed to take over this function, however, a high degree of 
speculation is needed. Speculation is inevitable and even desirable for two reasons in 
the capital market. On the one hand, about future possible returns on investment can 
only be speculated to a certain degree since the future demand for products and goods 
can not be known today yet. It is a phenomenon known also from philosophical and 
theological speculation that the speculative starts where complete information and 
complete empirical knowledge are impossible, where, however, there is at least some 
empirical insight. The greater overall scheme is inferred from fragmentary experience 
and incomplete empirical knowledge.  
Stock market speculation is not only a game and gambling, but an anticipation of 
future developments based on incomplete information and empirical data that include 
also the anticipations of the anticipations of the other speculating players and contains 
also an element of gambling. The theories of the justification of the speculation in the 
19th century took as a basis mostly the question whether the stock market speculation is 
gambling or betting. Gambling was not hold to be ethically justifiable whereas betting 
was taken to be ethically permissible. The result of the considerations in 19
th century on 
speculation was that speculation is a bet and not gambling and that, as a bet, it is 
                                                  
7 This positions was also taken by von Nell-Breuning: Grundzüge der Börsenmoral (Fundamentals of 
Stock Market Morals), Freiburg i. Br. (Herder) 1928, p. 9, and O. von Nell-Breuning:: 
„Volkswirtschaftlicher Wert und Unwert der Börsenspekulation“ (The Economic Utility and Disutility of 
Stock Market Speculation), Stimmen der Zeit (Voices of the Time), 114 (1928), p. 46-56, here p. 52.   7 
ethically permissible because in the case of betting more strict institutional conditions 
and a stronger intellectual element of correct anticipation of reality are given than in the 
case of pure gambling where the correct anticipation of the future outcome results just 
from good luck. 
The inevitability of speculation results from the problem of uncertainty about the 
future. In the capital market, two central uncertainties play a role, the uncertainty about 
the future profits of enterprises and the uncertainty about the future development of the 
value of enterprises or their shares, about their future capital value. Correspondingly, 
speculation aims at both, at the correct anticipation of the firm’s profits or - in the case 
of the joint stock company – of its dividends paid and at the correct anticipation of the 
development of the stock, of the share price. 
On the other hand, speculation is also necessary to create those volumes of trade for 
shares that are necessary to fulfil the liquidity function of the capital market. The 
strength of the share market is that the shareholders’ long-term investments in 
enterprises can be liquidated and reconverted into cash at any time - even if not always 
with a profit. This liquidation of long-term investments and their transformation into 
cash is, however, only possible if there is professional speculation and professional 
share trading because investors would run otherwise the risk of meeting no effective 
demand for their wish to sell and liquidate and would be locked into their investment.8  
For both reasons, for the inevitable uncertainty about future corporate profits and for 
the necessity to create liquidity in the market for shares in corporations, speculation is 
inevitable in the capital market, and no efficient capital market conceivable without 
speculation. The resentment against stock market speculation finds, therefore, no 
rational justification. 
Since speculation is useful and satisfies the purpose of the capital market, it should 
not be hindered. Popular slogans that one should stop speculation do not find 
justification since they contradict the functional conditions and objectives of optimal 
capital allocation in the capital market. Also the p ossibility of low-priced “people’s 
shares” that the German government proclaimed and offered to the public in the shares 
of the privatized state firms for telecommunication and the mail service, Deutsche 
Telekom (German Telecom Service) as well as Deutsche Post (German Mail), must be 
criticized from the understanding of the inevitability of the speculative character even 
of these shares. Since the share market is necessarily speculative, there can not be a 
low-priced share which would be certain to rise and not be subjected to speculation and 
uncertainty about its future price. Every stock, also the stock of former state monopoly 
firms as the telephone or mail service, is subject to the share price risk and the 
fluctuations of the stock market. It is one of the weaknesses of small investors that they 
usually underestimate the risks in the development of the share price. The realistic 
assessment of risk is also a postulate of the ethics of business. The sense of reality is a 
morally relevant quality. 
Instead of propagating and offering assumedly low-priced shares, it would have been 
more reasonable to follow the objective of developing a people’s capitalism instead of 
issuing “people’s shares”. In a democratic society, it is desirable that as many people as 
possible participate in the decisions about investments and enterprises, and in this way 
                                                  
8 Cf. also Peter Koslowski: Ethik der Banken und der Börse. Finanzinstitutionen, Finanzmärkte, Insider-
Handel (The Ethics of Banking and of the Stock Exchange. Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, 
Insider Trading), Tübingen (Mohr Siebeck) 1997.   8 
about future economical strategies, and that the entire economic knowledge of a nation 
and the individuals’ appraisal of future share value enter the valuations of the capital 
market. In this sense, the objective of a “people’s capitalism” which serve the efficiency 
of the capital market is quite desirable. In order to achieve the objective of an efficient 
capital allocation, the concentration on of a few “people’s shares” is, however, not a 
viable strategy. Rather, an investment activity scattered as widely as possible amongst 
social groups and an investment as widely diversified into the stocks of innovative and 
small enterprises should be aimed at. 
If one summarizes the purposes or functions of the capital market, it becomes visible 
that the efficient allocation of capital into purposes of investment under conditions of 
information efficiency and capital liquidity or the transformability of the investment 
into liquid means are at the core of the objectives and the conditions of functioning of 
the capital market.9 
In this way, it becomes possible to answer the question which ethical and economic 
values must be taken into account in the globalized capital market. In order to fulfil 
information efficiency and the liquidity function, as many parties in supply and demand 
in the market for capital should be active to make the volumes of the supply and 
demand for capital so large that real markets for corporate control and corporate 
strategies arise. The globalization supports, therefore, the information efficiency and the 
liquidity of the capital market through the enlargement and greater liquidity of this 
market. An efficient capital market requires sufficient liquidity so that investors are not 
locked into their investments.10 On the other hand, the wealth preservation function and 
the savings function of the capital market require that the fluctuations in the value of 
shares do not reach too large amplitudes in the capital market. As a result, two criteria 
must be realized in the capital market at the same time: On the one hand, the investment 
and disinvestment decisions in the capital market must allocate quickly and smoothly 
capital to its best use. On the other hand, the high degree of allocation and reallocation 
as well as the level of trading volume must not cause exaggerated and unnecessary 
fluctuations in the share prices that make savers and investors feel insecure and drive 
them out of the capital market. 
The conditions of the high mobility and efficient allocation of capital, on the one 
                                                  
9 Cf. also Gerhard Picot: „M&A aus Sicht der Kapitalmärkte“ (M&A from the Point of View of the 
Capital Markets), in: G. Picot:  Handbuch Mergers & Acquisitions (Handbook of Mergers & 
Acquisitions), Stuttgart (Schäffer-Poeschel) 2000, p. 33-52. 
10 John R. Boatright: Ethics in Finance, Malden Mass., Oxford (Blackwell) 1999, p. 116, shows how the 
missing possibility to liquidate high volumes of shares at the same time can be a problem for large 
pension funds because they are frequently not in the position to formulate their protest against low 
performance management teams by selling la rge packages of the shares they hold in these firms without 
undergoing a high share price risk. They must, therefore, influence the management directly through 
influence on the management decisions and stay invested in the enterprise. A pensions fund as CalPERS 
(California Public Employees' Retirement System) that manages assets worth 80 billion dollars would 
find it difficult to sell shares of General Motors worth 1 billion dollars at once without causing a loss of 
their value in the stock exchange. - The change of the form of capitalism from the private property and 
owner capitalism to the "pension fund capitalism" is indicated by the following figures: "In 1970, 
individuals held more than 72 percent of shares, while institutional investors (pensions, mutual funds, 
insurance companies, and private trusts and endowments) accounted for about 16 percent. By 1990, the 
holdings of institutions had risen to more than 53 percent, with private and public pension funds owning 
approx. 28 percent of the equities of US firms." (Boatright, op. cit., p. 114).   9 
hand, and the conditions of the stability of the share prices in the capital market, on the 
other hand, stand in a relationship of a certain tension towards each other that also 
influences speculation. On the one hand, the speculation in shares must trace every even 
very insignificant change in the chances for profits from investments and make visible 
in the market. On the other hand speculation must also avoid causing artificial value 
fluctuations that do not have any basis in the substantial value of stock.  
From this Janus-headedness of speculation follows that speculation is supposed to 
be, on the one hand, highly speculative and to find out the smallest changes and 
differentials of value, but should, on the other hand, not produce any artificial volatility. 
In the formation of the value orientation that should direct the actions of capital market 
participants, a tension arises here in speculation that speculates because of the volatile 
value changes of shares between the speculation that destabilizes shares prices and the 
speculation that stabilizes the volatility of share prices. 
It must not be overlooked, however, that the stock market speculation rewards such 
speculative anticipations w hich have anticipated improbable value increases correctly. 
By this measure, the capital market rewards at the same time highly speculative 
speculation that curbs the price fluctuations and takes price volatility out of the market. 
Speculation can be regarded in general as the phenomenon of price arbitrage 
between different points of time. In the same way as spatial arbitrage produces a profit 
from mediating between price differences between different places in space, temporal 
arbitrage or speculation makes profit from mediating between differences in prices 
between different points in time. When differences in the prices of goods in two cities, 
transfers the goods from the city with a low price and high supply to the other city with 
high price and low supply,11 he contributes to levelling the prices at the two places and 
earns a profit from the economically useful action of spatial arbitrage. 
Speculation engages in arbitrage between the variations of value at different points 
or epochs in the course of time. The speculating person who speculates à la hausse, 
goes long, assumes that the corporate shares that he buys today will have a higher value 
in the future. As long as the speculators follow the general opinion in their speculation, 
they will not make any especially high speculative profit. If, on the other hand, they 
speculate against the prevalent opinion, their speculative gains will be considerable, 
provided they have been right. At the same time, these speculators will play a price-
stabilizing role when the price of the share has risen since they will provide a higher 
supply of the share in question that will curb the share price at the point in time. A 
normativity of the processes effective in reality becomes visible here in as far as the 
interest of the speculators to realize a profit through the correct but improbable 
speculation goes hand in hand with the common interest of the market to stabilize share 
prices through a higher supply of those shares that are in high demand and that the 
speculators supply. If speculation made profit only by strategies increasing volatility, it 




                                                  
11 Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologiae II-II, qu. 77, art. 3(4), discusses this question and grants 
expressly an important, morally justified, economic function to arbitrage and the arbitrageur. 
12 Cf. for the business ethics of speculation and insider trading Peter Koslowski: Ethik der Banken und 
der Börse, loc. cit., p. 61-90.   10 
IV. On the ethics of financial consulting<A[consultation|discussion]> 
 
 
The question as to the ethical duties of financial consultants addresses the individual 
ethics of the correct action within the framework of the institutional setting of the 
capital market. Consultants are obliged, due to their fiduciary position towards their 
customers, to act in the customer’s best interest, not in their own best interest. They are 
subject to fiduciary duties and duties of due diligence, duties that have been further 
differentiated in American law and its business ethics than in Continental European 
civil law and business ethics. These duties include the duty to prudence and due 
diligence or adequate care in working for the customer. Every performance of financial 
consultants that does not protect the customer’ interest is not diligent or prudent is a 
breach of their duty and of the fiduciary relationship with the customer.  
In the capital market, the financial consultant is tempted to engage in „churning”, 
„twisting” or „flipping” the customer. The temptation to breach the fiduciary duty is 
always around. Churning is the excessive trading of stocks that creates only 
commissions and fees for the bank or the broker but does not produce any benefit for 
the customer. Recommendations of shares and of trading actions which lead to churning 
represent a breach of the broker’s obligation as the customer’s trustee to recommend 
only suitable investments and to reveal the risks linked to them. The financial 
consultant stands here under diverse role expectations which often lead to conflicts of 
interest which are ethically relevant. As an employee of a bank the consultant must 
realize, for instance, the customer’s interest in a profitable investment and, at the same 
time, the interest of the bank in commission payments etc. 
Non-professional day traders that are churned not so much by their consultants, but 
by themselves are a special case. According to investigations of the German Federal 
Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services ( Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin), many day traders lose their invested capital 
through incessant buying and selling of the same shares because they pay ever 
increasing amounts of commission for their trades to their online banks or brokers. The 
commissions eat up frequently the profits from share sales which the day trader has 
only in view.13 
Twisting is the replacement of an insurance contract through a new one that does, 
however, no represent a real improvement for the insured, but creates only commission 
for the insurance broker and produces cost for the insured. Flipping is the replacement 
of a given credit contract by one or several new ones that also pretends to create an 
improvement for the credit applicant in his debtor situation without realizing it since 
only the credit broker earns in these transactions by earning commissions. 
All three phenomena of churning, twisting, and flipping are a breach of the fiduciary 
relationship. They are not only a breach of the value of good consulting but a positive 
                                                  
13 The Director of the Dept. III, German Federal Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services 
(Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin), Günter Birnbaum, presented his agency’s 
findings on day trading in his lecture „Einflussfaktoren am Kapitalmarkt: Autoritäten, Paragrafen, 
Leitbilder“ (Performance Influencing Factors in the Capital Market: Authorities, Paragraphs, Guiding 
Ideas) at the conference „Ethik des Kapitalmarkts“ (The Ethics of the Capital Market) organized by the 
Deutsches Netzwerk Wirtschaftsethik (German Business Ethics Network) and others at the  Siemens 
Forum Munich, Germany, on 12 October 2001.   11 
breach of the consultant’s fiduciary duty. In serious cases, this breach of duty can not be 
combated only through an ethical value orientation of the financial service provider, but 
must be sanctioned by the law, i.e. by the sentencing of compensation payments and, 
where appropriate, of criminal punishment. However, this legal sanction is appropriate 
only, where a fiduciary relation has actually come into existence. Where customers 
renounce that a fiduciary relationship has been established and explicitly want to act 
according to the maxim  caveat emptor, the buyer be aware, they can  not claim 
afterwards an increased fiduciary duty of the financial service provider. 
 
 
V. Mergers and acquisitions: the capital market as the market for corporate control and 
the importance of a globalized competition between management teams 
 
In the newest development of the global capital market, it becomes increasingly 
visible that a central function of the capital market is not only the allocation of capital, 
but also the allocation of management capability and knowledge so that they find in 
each case their best use. The capital market is not only the market for capital, but also 
for corporate control, for corporate governance. Corporate control that is secured by the 
acquisition of the majority of the shares of a corporation becomes more and more 
important in the present day capital market. Its trading is part of the function of the 
capital market to secure the optimal allocation of capital. The ownership of the majority 
of the stocks of an enterprise provides the control over this enterprise. The acquisition 
of 51 per cent of the shares represents a radical advance in control as compared to the 
acquisition of 49 per cent. This advance is also expressed in the increased relative price 
of a majority share ownership.  
Corporate control or corporate governance is carried out increasingly either by 
purchasing the majority of the corporation’s shares, even against the will of the of the 
target company’s management, or by mergers. 
The question must be asked why there has been such an increase in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). The globalization of the world economy is an engine for M&A. 
Through the purchase of other companies, the company taking over gains advantages 
for it corporate network. The network advantages through the integration of whole new 
companies that continue to exist frequently as independent division of the firm after the 
merger gain in importance as compared to the classical vertical integration or to the 
efficiency increase through economies of scale of a mere increase in size. 
The purchase of stages of product development and of production processes through 
the purchase of the companies which own the know-how of these stages leads to a 
shortening of the time for research and development. A company taking over can buy 
knowledge and know-how through the takeover. The takeover results in shortening the 
development of new products and processes.  
A completely new form of using the time zones becomes possible: In research and 
development, 24 hours a day can be worked globally on the same projects provided a 
company acquires different companies with research and development activities in the 
same product that are active in all time zones.14 Through the acquisition or sale of an 
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enterprise or of parts of it, a corporation can carry out adaptations of the  corporate 
structure, size, and borderline to other corporations which would require more time if 
the firm built up new parts of the corporation within the old organization. In this way, 
the borderline of the corporation becomes more fluid and varying. Also the complexity 
and increased obsolescence of products requires increasingly the acquisition or merger 
instead of research and development within the firm, not at last, in order to save time 
for R&D. 
On the other hand, it is objected to the increasing number of hostile and of friendly 
takeovers that only a small number of corporate takeovers succeeds. Studies made by 
the consulting firms Price Waterhouse and A. E. Kearny show that 40.000 mergers 
occurred worldwide in the period 1996 to 2001 that had a total value of 5 trillion US-
dollars. 80 per cent of the merged firms did not earn the capital costs of the merger 
transaction. 30 per cent of these mergers were either reversed or the firms bought were 
sold again. A. E. Kearny estimates that the rate of failure of mergers is about 60-75 per 
cent.15 
These numbers are, however, not necessarily an argument against hostile takeovers 
since they do not consider the effect of the takeover threat on the management of 
companies which were  not taken over. The effect of the takeover threat on the 
management of all firms in the market is that all management teams are forced by this 
threat to increase or at least to maintain their performance level. The effect of a 
takeover threat and of a lively market for corporate control  is a kind of general 
prevention against the shirking of management, against a too comfortable life of 
management teams. 
The effect of the general prevention measure against management shirking that the 
takeover threat exerts is not reflected in the number of successes of the takeovers that 
actually occurred. The possibility and the threat of being taken over represents a general 
prevention of the market for corporate control against shirking or becoming lazy of 
management teams. In judging the effect of the takeover threat, it is not the number of 
mergers and takeovers that actually occurred and were successful or unsuccessful that is 
decisive but the general threat and prevention of management shirking through the 
general takeover threat..  
How are so-called hostile takeovers to be judged ethically which occur against the 
explained will of the management of the company taken over? For the economic and 
ethical value of mergers and acquisitions, the question about the economic legitimacy in 
the sense of economic functionality of the hostile takeover is central. Is the hostile 
takeover to be refuted as a hostile process or does it serve the purpose of the capital 
market to secure and improve the optimal capital allocation and the control of corporate 
control? The central legitimacy for hostile takeovers lies in the right of the owners of a 
corporation to sell their part in the property of a firm to those that offer them the highest 
price for these parts or shares of the firm. If the owner of the firm is the owner of the 
majority of the shares, the central legitimacy for hostile takeovers is derived from his 
right to exchange the management if he reaches the justified conclusion that the 
management damages the enterprise or does not realize the maximum value creation of 
                                                                                                                                                   
Theoretical Introduction), Wiesbaden (Gabler) 3rd edition 2000, p. 5f. 
15 Quoted in Nikolaus Schweikart: „Der getriebene Chef. Shareholder value über all – das US-Modell 
setzt sich durch“ (The Haunted Boss. Shareholder Value Above All - the US Model Gains Dominance), 
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the enterprise. 
From the logic of the owners’ property right and of the owner or shareholder 
principle results that the management of the target enterprise must not refuse, if a 
takeover threat occurs, any offer that gives the shareholders the possib ility of selling 
their shares at a price that is usually above the given share price. Measures of defence 
that hinder or stop this possibility of selling the shares must be judged, therefore, as 
value destruction because they deprive the owners or shareholders of the possibility to 
sell their property, their shares, at higher value. The functional use of hostile takeovers 
is unquestionable in case of an inadequate performance of the management of the target 
corporation or in case of the substantiated expectation that the management team taking 
over will create a higher corporate value.  
In Germany, the objection is frequently raised against the owner- or shareholder 
value-principle,16 that it violates the consensus principle, the principle that the firm 
should be managed with the consensus of everyone active in the enterprise, with the 
consensus of all stake-holders. It is also referred in the German context to the co-
determination legislation applicable to German large-scale enterprises which safeguards 
the employee representation a share in the decision-making in the firm’s management 
on the supervisory board level and, therefore, limits the shareholders’ right to determine 
the management without consulting the employee representation. 
The Anglo-American model, on the other hand, emphasizes the external control of 
the management and the enterprise through the shareholders’ right of control which is a 
control coming from outside of the firm in contrast to the internal control by 
stakeholders in the German model. At the foundations of the Anglo-American model, 
one finds fairly realistic assumptions about the dangers that the enterprise faces by its 
internal stakeholders. Situations are conceivable and likely in which the management 
and the employees prefer management decisions that make life easier for them at the 
shareholders’ expense by using up he firm’s value and the shareholders’ capital, e. g. by 
paying the owners or shareholders none or too small dividends or returns on investment 
and by concealing this value destruction to the shareholders and to the stakeholders 
themselves. If one assumes that all members of an organization are tempted to have an 
easy life for them personally in the organization and that this tendency is counteracted 
by the owners or shareholders from the outside, it is recognizable that the control of the 
enterprise by the shareholders is necessary. The shareholders are the countervailing 
power against the collusion of the firm’s members. 
Amongst the explanations given for hostile takeovers, it is especially the “free cash 
flow-hypothesis” introduced by Jensen that points to the danger of the management’s 
shirking in mature corporations and industries.17 In mature industries, high positions of 
free cash flow arise, high returns from turnover and depreciation which should be paid 
out as dividends to the shareholder and be reinvested by them in other projects or firms 
in order to secure the efficient allocation of capital. It is, however, in the interest of the 
managers of these firms to leave the free cash flows in the enterprise since they increase 
                                                  
16 Cf. on the debate Peter Koslowski: „Shareholder Value und der Zweck des Unternehmens“ 
(Shareholder Value and the Purpose of the Enterprise), in: Peter Koslowski (ed.): Shareholder Value und 
die Kriterien des Unternehmenserfolgs (Shareholder Value and the Criteria of Corporate Success), 
Heidelberg (Physica) 1999, p. 1-32. 
17 Michael C. Jensen: "Agencies Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeover", American 
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thereby the degree of their freedom and their potential for shirking in the firm by 
lowering the control of the capital market on their performance by diverting dividends 
into internal revenue of the firm. 
The threat of hostile takeovers to be taken over by international management teams 
and investors in globalized markets reduces the management’s inclination to keep 
returns on capital or profits in the firm. It also prevents the tendency to expand t he 
firm’s turnover without appropriate profits at the expense of the shareholder value. If 
the management’s income is made to be dependent on its performance and this 
performance is measured in turnover the management will again expand turnover at the 
expense of dividend incomes. 
The causality that the free cash flow hypothesis analyzes can also described as the 
more general phenomenon that people feel entitled to lean back and to work in a less 
hard way if they have founded and built up something, be it an enterprise or any other 
achievement. This is, of course, not in the interest of the institutions for which they set 
up something. On the other hand, the necessity arises here in the case of a hostile 
takeover to appreciate the building up achievement and to compensate by compensation 
payments that share that the management caused in the added value of the enterprise 
that had not been paid for by the management’s contractual income. The criticism of 
high compensation payments or “golden parachutes” paid to  managers that are fired 
because of hostile takeovers as it is frequently expressed after hostile takeovers must be 
put into perspective. 
A further argument for the necessity to allow, if not to encourage, hostile takeovers 
is the argument that the shareholders, in general, are not able to be present all the time 
in the firm and can not defend their interests continuously within the firm, particularly 
not in the large joint stock firm with a large number of small “anonymous” 
shareholders. In this situation, the investors or shareholders are able to prevent their 
“exploitation” or their being taken advantage of by the management only through the 
right to hire and fire the management or at least to threat to be able to fire and displace 
it in a hostile takeover. 
 
VI. The consensus of those concerned as internal self-control versus competition as 
external control through the takeover by the competitor: two models of (corporate) 
governance 
 
In the German model of corporate governance, it is assumed that the consensus of 
the groups concerned makes already sure by its very quality of being a consensus that 
the best decision is taken for the enterprise and that consensus will secure that the 
decision best for the company is realized. Disagreement or decision-making without 
consensus between the groups working in the enterprise and concerned by its fate is 
regarded in this model as a sign of crisis and of inadequate management, whereas 
consensus is regarded, in full agreement with Jürgen Habermas’s consensus theory of 
truth, as the guarantee of the correctness or “truth” of the decision taken. 
It is easily recognizable that fundamental philosophical differences in the conception 
of governance, constitutional arrangements, governing, and control come into play at 
the debate about corporate governance and the constitution of the firm, at the question 
of consensus principle versus shareholder value principle. The questions about 
corporate governance reach as far as to the debate about the political constitution.  
In the German or, more broadly, in the Continental European understanding of the   15 
republican constitution and government, the idea of self-government through 
consensus, the general will model, is very influential although representative 
government prevails in fact. In the Anglo-American understanding of the republic, the 
idea of representative government through the representation of voter groups and the 
competition and alternating rule of competing political teams in politics and 
competition between management teams in the economy are the guiding idea. In both 
realms, in politics and in the economy, not the idea of consensus but of competition for 
voters or shareholders coming from outside of the decision-making groups is central in 
the American tradition, whereas internal consensus or agreement between the insiders 
in politics and in the economy is characteristic for the Continental European tradition 
since Rousseau’s idea of the general will, the volonté générale.  
The process of globalization of capital markets supports the competition principle, 
not the consensus principle. It requires and introduces the globalization of a market for 
corporate control and, therefore, the principle of competition between management 
teams, not the idea of a consensus of insiders in the economy. A foreign investor who is 
not an insider in the industry of another country can not rely on insider consensus as a 
means of controlling the performance of a management team of a foreign firm he wants 
to invest in. 
Consensus does not guarantee the truth of the decisions made in consensus. A 
consensus of stakeholder groups is conceivable that decides at the expense of other 
stakeholders who have been contingently or systematically absent when the 
“consensus” had been formed. It is also well possible that all stakeholders of a firm 
decide and act under illusions - and might even have a systematic interest to confirm 
each other in these illusions - about the actual state and performance of the republic or 
of the firm. These illusions of insiders about their performance might be so pervasive 
that it can be destroyed only through the possibility that an outsider breaks through the 
delusion of the insiders’ consensus from the outside by using the competition for 
corporate control and external alternative m anagement teams for opening up the 
“consensualized” firms. 
In the debate in the European Union about corporate governance, the constitution of 
the firm, and the role of capital markets, basic principles of corporate governance are at 
stake. The EU Commission urged Germany in 2001, to make the take-over directive of 
the Commission actual law in German legislation and jurisdiction. This directive 
requires the strengthening of corporate control through facilitating hostile takeovers and 
abolishing laws hindering market competition. Regulations are to be removed that allow 
the state or state owned firms to have privileges of restricting competition. Prominent 
cases are the Volkswagen-Law that grants special voting rights to the State of Lower 
Saxony as the main share holder of Volkswagen Corporation or the law that gives state 
owned banks the privilege that their liquidity is guaranteed by the state as in the case of 
the state banks (Landesbanken). 
It is of philosophical interest that the former Commissioner for Industry, Mario 
Monti, has expressed the view <A[opin  that the European Union can not make any 
difference between firms that are owned privately and firms that are owned by the state. 
State ownership in firms can not justify, according to Mario Monti, an institutionalized 
competitive advantage since this advantage disturbs the competition between private 
and governmental or semi-governmental firms.18  
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One can look at this postulate from two perspectives. One could object that the EU 
Commission questions by i ts policy the distinction of state and society or economy 
which has been emphasized particularly in Germany. 19 The commission seems to deny 
the special standing of the state among the other social institutions since it refuses to 
grant any special position to firms in which the state holds shares compared to those 
firms that are completely privately owned. On the other hand, one has to raise the 
objection against this position that giving a privilege to the enterprise in which the state 
holds shares cancels the very distinction of state and society by creating a third hybrid 
form of political-economic control that is neither economic nor political.  
The hybrid of the state owned business firm follows neither the market principles of 
competition, consumer sovereignty, and profit or loss nor the political principles of 
voter sovereignty and orientation on the common good. The semi-governmental firm is 
neither fully subjected to economic competition and completely for profit, nor is it 
completely not-for-profit and oriented at the common good. It can make profit, but the 
use of this profit is then decided frequently on political grounds that can neither be 
checked by the market nor by the voter. The semi-governmental firm belongs neither 
completely to the sphere of government and the state nor completely to the societal and 
economic sphere. It distorts, in fact, competition in the sphere of the economy and 
society since it can make use of privileges against its privately owned competitors. 
The dynamics of the EU single market move here into the same direction as the 
dynamics of the global world market. Within the single market of the EU, it is difficult 
to give good reasons why Volkswagen should have competitive advantages due to the 
fact that the State of Lower Saxony holds a major part of its shares as compared to its 
French competitors like Peugeot or Renault that are, however, also partially state 
owned. It is hard to see why the politicians elected for running the State of Lower 
Saxony or the French Republic should have a higher competence to run Volkswagen or 
Peugeot or Renault respectively than managers coming from industry. The criterion that 
state and society, government and economy, should be functionally separated requires, 
for the sake of the protection of the essential state functions, that the hybrid forms of 
joint stock companies that are half state- and half privately owned should be given up in 
favour of companies that are fully privatized joint stock companies and a small number 
of companies that are fully state-owned and act completely in the public interest where 
this can be justified.20 
If one asks the question which basic value orientations and which identifications 
with basic principles stand behind the dispute about the permissibility or non-
permissibility of hostile corporate takeovers, one is led to the opposites of consensus 
and competition, self-control and control from the outside. The German model of 
corporate governance is based on the consensus principle and the self-control of 
insiders and stakeholders. It allots a subordinate role to the control of management from 
outside of the firm by the capital market. The essential control of the corporation is 
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supposed to be carried out as the self-control of the stakeholders within the firm. The 
Anglo-American model of corporate control, on the other hand, assumes that consensus 
does not necessarily imply efficiency and does not secure high performance since the 
emphasis on the value of consensus furthers the self-indulgence of those participating in 
the consensual discourse and eases their rash satisfaction with solutions and decisions 
pleasing them. 
Traditions are influenced by and specific to culture and religion. Cultural tradition 
and even religious denominations play a role in the positions on political and corporate 
governance. In the Puritan, Calvinist-Protestant tradition, there seems to be a stronger 
distrust in the individuals’ self-control and self-appraisal than in the Lutheran -Protestant 
and the Catholic tradition. The denominational and, therefore, cultural differences have 
shaped the different models and ideas of republicanism which have developed from the 
American and from the French revolution.   
According to the Anglo-American Puritan model, the persons concerned and also the 
leaders of government and business are unable to judge their own performance properly 
due to the distortion of human judgment by self-interest - or theologically speaking due 
to the distortion of human intention and self-interest by original sin. When we are 
supposed to judge our own performance we are always in a conflict of interest, in the 
conflict between our interest in objectivity and our self-interest to appear to be good to 
ourselves and to others.  
On the other hand, the consensus model of republicanism, of political government 
and corporate governance, based on the assumption of the identity of the governing and 
the governed assumes that the consensus or Rousseau’s volonté générale is the truth-
generating element of political and other governing processes  that removes the 
distortedness of self-interested decision-makers into decision-makers that are oriented 
at the common good or the volonté générale. That consensus nullifies the conflict of 
interest between self-interest and objectivity is the conviction of this tradition.   
The identity-philosophical interpretation of democracy as the unity of the governing 
and the governed dominates the German and Continental-European political 
philosophy. Its understanding of government from Rousseau and Hegel to Habermas is 
not as theoretically superior as this tradition suggests to itself. It is based on the 
questionable basic assumption that there is an absolute identity of subject and object, an 
idea that originates from Hegel’s and Schelling’s philosophy. In the same way as the 
Hegel’s absolute subject becomes conscious at the absolute object and in identity with 
this object, the nation as an object becomes conscious of itself in the subject of the state. 
Government and people are an absolute subject-object in which the nation or people 
becomes self-conscious. Consensus is the highest form of this subject-object in which 
there is identity between subject and object, state and society, governing and 
governed.21  
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The identity-philosophical thinking deduces from this supposed identity of the 
subject and object of political power that a nation’s becoming subjective-objective or 
conscious takes place in the republican state in the consensus of the governing and the 
governed.  Consensual governance leads to the identity of the state and the 
nation/people, the legislator and the legislated, the author and the addressee of the law. 
Through this identity of consensus, political rule is sublated or abolished and 
transformed into self-government. Discourse theoretical approaches to  corporate 
governance transfer the consensus and identity theoretical model of political 
government to the firm and its governance. They postulate that stakeholder discourse 
and consensus in the firm ought to be the principles of corporate governance and 
control.22 
From the viewpoint of a general anthropological theory of human self-interestedness 
and of the human beings’ missing objectivity towards themselves, the discourse theory 
of human decision-making remains below the complexity of the task of controlling 
power. The tendency observable in the corporatist state to collusions and coalitions of 
influential interest-groups or lobbyists forces one to emphasize the need for the control 
of political and economic power through competition, through individuals and 
institutions that come from the outside to check organizations. Hostile takeovers are one 
of the possible control mechanisms against mistaken forms of consensus and of 
coalitions between the management and the stakeholder or pressure groups within the 
firm. Hostile takeovers, therefore, should be rather encouraged than hindered by the 
legislation on corporate governance. A greater control of the management of large-scale 
enterprises through competing management teams and their takeover threat will result 
in an increased performance of these firms.  
The need for a limitation of the consensus principle does not exclude to retain 
elements of the co-determination legislation as it is mandatory for German large-scale 
enterprises. The option for some worker participation does not imply, however, equal 
voting rights of the employees at the supervisory board level. Rather, it requires an end 
to the accumulation of power by the trade-unions in the supervisory board of large-scale 
enterprises as it developed in Germany where many CEOs claim that they can not 
decide against the worker representation in the board dominated by the unions that 
usually organize and represent the employees. Co-determination in the form of 
employee representation on the supervisory board does not violate the owner- or 
shareholder value-principle if and only if the clear majority of votes and therefore the 
right of the last decision remain with the owners or shareholders. At present, this is not 
the case in Germany. An enormous insider position has been built up by the unions 
since their representatives sit in practically all supervisory boards of large-scale 
enterprises as the representatives of the employee representation.  
The participation or do-determination principle can increase corporate performance 
when it understood as a principle of representation and not as a consensus principle and 
when it is instituted together with the control principle of hostile takeovers. The co-
determination of the employees on the board increases the learning capacity of the 
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organization and also fulfils a pacification function in conflict situations within the 
enterprise as long as the majority vote of the shareholders or owners is safeguarded.  
The synthesis between the Anglo-American principle of the capital market as the 
market for corporate control and the German principle of co-determination as employee 
representation in corporate governance on the board level is possible also under 
conditions of globalization. This synthesis can improve the firm’s ability to discover 
chances and weaknesses within the organization and to use this knowledge for 
increased performance. The synthesis of the capital market control model with the co-
determination model of corporate governance is likely to be superior to the “pure” 
models of either the capital market control or the co-determination governance model. 
Globalization will move corporate governance in the European Union in the direction of 
such a synthesis. It is likely that this model will radiate from the EU to the g lobal 
financial markets. 